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Abstract
While labour provisions have been inserted in a number of EU free trade agreements (FTAs), extant clauses are widely
perceived as ineffective. This article argues that there is a need to rethink the dispute settlement mechanisms related to
labour provisions if their effectiveness is to be increased. It proceeds in three steps. First, we look at the current state of
the art of labour provisions in EU FTAs in terms of legal design and practice and argue that the current arrangements are
ill-equipped to foster compliance with labour standards. Second, we explore avenues to enhance the design of FTA labour
provisions by reconsidering basic elements of the dispute settlement structure. Examining US FTA labour provisions, we
highlight the importance of a formal complaint mechanism, on the one hand, and the availability of economic sanctions,
on the other. Based on a review of existing practice, we contend, however, that these elements alone are not sufficient
to effectively enforce FTA labour provisions. We argue that for FTA labour provisions to be effective, the current state-
to-state model of dispute settlement needs to be complemented by a third-party-state dimension and that, additionally,
there are good reasons to consider a third party–third party dispute settlement component. We ground these reflections
in experiences with already existing instruments in other areas, namely investor-state dispute settlement and voluntary
sustainability standards. Thirdly, we discuss options to better connect the dispute settlement mechanisms of FTA labour
provisions to other international instruments for labour standards protection with a view to creating synergies and avoid-
ing fragmentation between the different regimes. The focus here is on the International Labour Organization’s supervisory
mechanism and the framework of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.
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1. Introduction
The protection of labour standards has become a fix-
ture in free trade agreements (FTAs) concluded by the
EU. This corresponds to a more general trend which
has seen a steady increase in the number of FTAs in-
cluding labour provisions since the 1990s (International
Labour Organization [ILO], 2009, 2013), counting more
than 70 such agreements in 2016 (ILO, 2016, p. 22). How-
ever, the provisions concerning labour rights are often re-
garded as ineffective in termsof actually enforcing labour
rights (see e.g. Campling, Harrison, Richardson, & Smith,
2016; Marx, Lein, & Brando, 2016; Scheuerman, 2001;
Van Roozendaal, 2015; Vogt, 2015). In particular, there
is concern that the implementation devices regarding
FTA labour provisions might be insufficient to address
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non-compliance in practice (Harrison, Barbu, Campling,
Richardson, & Smith, 2017; Marx & Soares, 2015; Marx
et al., 2016; Orbie & Van den Putte, 2016). While it is
recognized that FTA labour provisions may entail other
positive effects, such as increasing labour-related capac-
ity building (Cheong & Ebert, 2016; Ebert, 2016), there
is a growing consensus that the relevant enforcement
mechanisms, notably the arrangements for dispute set-
tlement, are unsuitable to significantly foster compliance
with labour rights (see e.g. Ebert, 2017; Scheuerman,
2001; Vogt, 2015).
In this article, we investigate how the institutional
design relating to labour provisions in FTAs can be im-
proved to foster better compliance, focusing on the role
of dispute settlement mechanisms. This focus emerges
in a wider academic debate in which the empowerment
of stakeholders to enforce compliance with international
rules is emphasized.Weassume that the integration of vi-
able dispute settlement mechanisms into the labour pro-
visions of FTAs can strengthen enforcement and compli-
ance. This can occur either through the threat of a pos-
sible dispute and the consequences that may come with
it (anticipatory effect) or through the dispute settlement
process proper, which may generate dynamics inducing
compliance, for example through the application of eco-
nomic sanctions or political pressure. This assumption is
grounded in theoretical and empirical literature in insti-
tutional economics, political science, and public policy
(see e.g. Ostrom, 2005). This literature suggests that ro-
bust monitoring and sanctioning systems are necessary
conditions for ensuring compliance with rules. In addi-
tion, international law scholarship refers to the impor-
tance of establishing a well-developed set of rules and
procedures to foster compliance with international rules,
although with less emphasis on disputes and sanction-
ing. This scholarship stresses that enforcement of inter-
national rules requires a set of procedures and mech-
anisms which implement (see e.g. the managerial ap-
proach put forward by Chayes & Handler Chayes, 1995)
or internalize international legal rules in the domestic le-
gal system (see e.g. Koh, 1997). Both theories stress the
importance of interactions between actors and mecha-
nisms which allow for interaction, for complying with in-
ternational rules.
Against this background, this article contributes to
the wider theoretical ambitions of this thematic issue
by focusing on an additional element of effectiveness,
namely institutional design effectiveness. As Niemann
and Bretherton (2013, p. 267) note, the concept of ef-
fectiveness is notoriously difficult to define and mea-
sure. The editors of this thematic issue start from a tra-
ditional conceptualization of impact and effectiveness
which is more aligned with a focus on goal-attainment
effectiveness (Conceição-Heldt & Meunier, 2014). Goal-
attainment effectiveness in the context of FTAs can be
seen as an actor’s ‘ability to realise the goals they set
for themselves’ (Acharya & Johnston, 2007, p. 13) or the
EU’s ability to reach its objectives by influencing other
actors (Van Schaik, 2013). However, before goals can
be achieved one needs to build institutions which facil-
itate the achievement of these goals. In this way, institu-
tional effectiveness presupposes goal-attainment effec-
tiveness. Institutional effectiveness builds on the work
of Elinor Ostrom (2005) and assesses whether the de-
sign of FTAs is effective. For example, FTAswith extensive
rules and procedures (that is, institutions) on enforce-
ment, monitoring, dispute settlement, and sanctioning
are hypothesised to be more effective in achieving their
objectives. In this light, we seek to explore how the insti-
tutional design of FTAs can be strengthened by analysing
the deficiencies of the current approaches.
The article proceeds in three steps. First, we look at
the current state of the art of labour provisions in EU FTAs
in terms of legal design and practice. We show that the
existing mechanisms are subject to significant deficits
that limit their potential to foster labour rights imple-
mentation. Second, we explore avenues to enhance the
design of FTA labour provisions by reconsidering basic
elements of the dispute settlement structure. Examin-
ing US FTA labour provisions, we highlight the impor-
tance of a formal complaint mechanism and the avail-
ability of economic sanctions. Based on existing prac-
tice, we contend, however, that these elements alone
are not sufficient to effectively enforce FTA labour pro-
visions. We argue that for FTA labour provisions to be ef-
fective the current state-to-state model of dispute settle-
ment needs to be complemented by a third-party-state
dimension and that, additionally, there are good reasons
to consider a third party-third party dispute settlement
component. We ground these reflections in experiences
with already existing instruments in other areas, namely
investor-state dispute settlement and voluntary sustain-
ability standards (VSS). Third, we ponder options to bet-
ter connect FTA labour provisions to other instruments
for labour rights protection with a view to creating syner-
gies and avoiding fragmentation between the different
regimes. The focus here is on the ILO supervisory mech-
anism, on the one hand, and the framework of the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (MNEs),
on the other hand. We close by briefly discussing the var-
ious alternatives.
2. The Need to Rethink Extant EU FTA Dispute
Settlement Mechanisms for Labour Provisions
Recent EU FTAs contain various types of commitments.1
This typically includes commitments regarding the obser-
vance of the ILO Fundamental Conventions,2 a commit-
ment to enforce domestic labour laws alongside a com-
1 For an overview see Bartels (2013, pp. 306–308), and ILO (2016, pp. 39–41). Many EU FTAs contain certain additional commitments, e.g. to ‘consider
the ratification’ of other ILO conventions and exchange information in this regard; see e.g. art. 229 (4) of the EU–Georgia Agreement.
2 See, e.g. art. 269(3) of the EU–Colombia and Peru Agreement; art. 365(2) of the EU–Moldova Agreement.
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mitment not to lower domestic labour rights in order to
increase levels of trade and investment.3 There is also an
obligation tomonitor and assess the impact of the agree-
ment on sustainable development issues including com-
pliance with labour rights.4 EU FTAs furthermore empha-
size institutional inter-party dialogue and cooperation
and the participation of civil society actors in the moni-
toring of the parties’ compliancewith the relevant labour
requirements (Postnikov & Bastiaens, 2014, p. 925).
The monitoring processes agreed upon in the Trade
and Sustainable Chapters of EU FTAs (TSD chapters) are
twofold. First of all, the general joint committees and
councils in charge of overseeing the agreement as a
whole, which are typically competent to discuss any mat-
ter in relation to the agreement, are also entitled to dis-
cuss sustainable development issues. Second, the main
innovation of TSD chapters resides in their monitoring
by institutions representing civil society actors which
are created by the agreement such as ‘Domestic Advi-
sory Groups’ (DAGs) for each party. Composed of NGOs,
business, trade unions, and other experts from relevant
stakeholder groups, these groups are supposed to meet
on a regular, typically annual basis.5 Dialogue at the offi-
cial level is therefore central, and civil society is an es-
sential actor in the implementation and monitoring of
TSD chapters.
Furthermore, EU FTAs provide for a special procedure
for labour provisions, including amicable consultations
and, subsequently, the review of the issue at stake by
an ad-hoc expert body6 which can adopt findings and
recommendations on the subject matter.7 As a follow-
up, the expert body’s report is presented to the parties,
and the party concerned is typically required to indicate
the measures it envisions undertaking with a view to ad-
dressing the findings and recommendations of the ex-
pert panel.8 The implementation of the relevant mea-
sures is then monitored by the competent committee or
body, as established under the relevant agreement.9
The experiences made thus far with dispute settle-
ment mechanisms pertaining to the labour provisions in
EU FTAs indicate at best limited potential for enforcing
labour rights (see also Marx et al., 2016). A key factor
limiting the enforcement leverage of these provisions is
the absence of sanctions which makes their implementa-
tion to a large extent dependent on the parties’ political
goodwill.10 Furthermore, no case is apparent where the
relevant formal consultation mechanisms—let alone the
non-sanction-based dispute settlement mechanisms—
have been activated (see e.g. Ebert, 2017, p. 308). In
addition, the absence of a formal complaint mechanism
has allowed the European Commission to refrain from
an in-depth assessment of labour rights violations raised
by civil society actors (see Vogt, 2015, pp. 857–858).11
This is not compensated by the dialogue activities con-
ducted under the EU FTAs, either among the state par-
ties or with civil society. Arguably, this can, in part, be
attributed to the failure of the European Commission to
use political influence to bring about changes regarding
labour rights in partner countries (see also Campling et
al., 2016, pp. 370–371). As a result, EU partner countries
appear to have been rather indifferent to the allegations
of relevant civil society actors (Vogt, 2015).
3. Rethinking the Dispute Settlement Process for
Labour Provisions in EU FTAs: Insights from Other
Approaches and Instruments
3.1. Increasing Enforcement Leverage: The Case of US
FTA Labour Provisions
The approach, notably used by the US and Canada, com-
bines cooperation and enforcement mechanisms, involv-
ing, as a last resort, economic sanctions. Under most US
FTAs there is a formal procedure under which civil so-
ciety actors can submit complaints against one country
to a designated national office with the Government of
another party.12 This national office subsequently exam-
ines the complaint following an internal procedure and
can, where appropriate, make recommendations on how
to resolve the problems at hand. The complaints proce-
dure under US FTAs is, hence, significantly more formal-
ized than under those concluded by the EU.
Furthermore, any state party can subsequently ini-
tiate ministerial consultations on the matter with the
other party13 and seek the establishment of an arbi-
tral panel for parts or the entirety of the agreement’s
labour chapter (ILO, 2009, 2013). The dispute settlement
mechanisms for labour provisions under US FTAs have
evolved considerably over time. In particular, the scope
of the arbitration-based dispute settlement mechanism
has been widened from applying only to certain labour
provisions14 to covering the entire labour chapter.15
3 See, e.g. art. 23.4 of the CETA.
4 See, e.g. art. 293 of the EU–Central America Agreement.
5 See, e.g. arts. 294–295 of the EU–Central America Agreement.
6 These are typically referred to as ‘panel of experts’ or ‘group of experts’.
7 See, e.g. art. 13.14 and 13.15 of the EU–Republic of Korea Agreement; art. 283–285 of the EU–Peru and Colombia Agreement.
8 See, e.g. art. 301(3) of the EU–Central America Agreement.
9 See, e.g. art. 285(4) of the EU–Peru and Colombia Agreement.
10 Evidence suggests that to have some positive effects sanction regimes do not necessarily need to be applied; rather it is often already the credible
threat of trade sanctions that can induce compliance (Charnovitz, 2001, p. 809; see also Davey, 2009, p. 124; Lacy & Niou, 2004).
11 For a case in point regarding the EU–Korea FTA, see Van den Putte (2015, p. 229).
12 See, e.g. art. 16(3) of the NAALC.
13 See, e.g. art. 22 of the NAALC and of the NAAEC, respectively.
14 See, e.g. arts. 16.6(7) and 17.10(7) of CAFTA-DR.
15 Cf. arts. 17.7, 18.12 and 21.2 of the US–Colombia Trade Agreement.
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Also, while most of the earlier US FTAs involve only
limited fines which are to be used for remedying the
compliance issue at hand,16 more recent US FTAs al-
low for inflicting trade sanctions under the general dis-
pute settlement mechanism.17 The enforcement mecha-
nism for labour provisions in US FTAs can thus be con-
sidered considerably more vigorous than that of their
EU counterparts.
However, the labour provisions contained in US FTAs
have so far not proven to be a highly effective enforce-
ment device. In fact, there has been only one labour
rights-related case where a dispute settlement proce-
dure under an FTAwas set in motion. This dispute, which
arose under CAFTA-DR between the US and Guatemala,
deals with severe violations of trade union rights in
Guatemala.18 The scarcity of labour-related disputes in
dispute settlement contrasts with the number of com-
plaints that have been filed under some of the agree-
ments. In the area of labour rights, most complaints have
been brought under the NAALC, amounting to about
40 complaints between its entry into force in 1994 and
2015. Under other US agreements, eight labour-related
complaints were filed with the US Government prior to
November 2017.19 The bulk of the complaints have so far
been terminated or resolved by the competent national
offices without even reaching ministerial consultations,
let alone dispute settlement stage, and with no evidence
that the often-serious alleged violations of the relevant
labour provisions were sufficiently addressed.20
A key factor accounting for this situation relates
to the institutional design of the relevant enforcement
mechanisms. First, civil society actors can only file com-
plaints but not activate the dispute settlement proce-
dure against the party complained against, a preroga-
tive that remains reserved for the state parties to the
FTAs. Second, US FTAs accord the state parties full dis-
cretion as to whether or not to activate the dispute set-
tlement mechanism, to solve the dispute through other
means, or to remain inactive. Even if the national office
of the party receiving the complaints identifies severe vi-
olations of labour provisions of the relevant agreement,
that state party is by no means legally compelled to take
further action. As a result, the relevant FTA parties have
been able to refrain from taking appropriate action even
in the face of allegations of serious breaches of the rel-
evant labour provisions. While recent US FTAs provide
the same dispute settlement mechanism for labour pro-
visions as for the agreements’ trade-specific provisions,
it turns out that this approach is unsuitable for labour
concerns given the parties’ widespread disinclination to
utilize these arrangements to tackle thesematters (Sagar,
2004, p. 948).
3.2. Providing Direct Access to Dispute Settlement for
Third Parties: The Case of Investment Arbitration
Investment treaties usually allow a foreign investor to
sue the host state before an international arbitral tri-
bunal in order to seek remedy for the breach of its
treaty-protected rights, such as those regarding non-
discrimination, fair and equitable treatment, or protec-
tion against expropriation. Traditionally, investment ar-
bitration is realized through a private and ad hoc tri-
bunal whereby the parties freely choose the arbitra-
tors and the rules of procedure according to a defined
model such as that of the International Centre for the
Settlement of Disputes (ICSID) or of the UN Conference
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL). These mecha-
nisms are modelled on commercial arbitration and typi-
cally do not provide for the possibility of appealing the
award. EU investment chapters in the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement between the EU and
Canada (CETA) and the EU–Vietnam Free Trade Agree-
ment (EUVFTA) contain a more elaborate ‘investment
court system’ (ICS),21 which sets up a permanent tribunal
composed of international trade and investment law ex-
perts from the EU, the partner country, and third coun-
tries, as well as appellate tribunals. Each case is normally
heard by threemembers, one from each category, drawn
by lot.22
Only investors can file a claim to the ICS.23 Concern-
ing access to the proceedings by third parties, both CETA
and the EU–Vietnam FTA include the UNCITRAL trans-
parency rules and provide for the publicity of procedural
documents and hearings.24 Submission of amici curiae
briefs is possible.25 The other State partymay receive the
procedural documents and make observations.26 ICS is
governed by ICSID or UNCITRAL procedural rules or other
rules if the parties agree.27 The submission of a claim
to the tribunal must be preceded by consultations aim-
16 See, e.g. art. 20.17 of CAFTA-DR.
17 See, e.g. art. 21.16 of the US–Colombia Trade Agreement.
18 See Final Report of the Panel in the Matter of Guatemala—Issues Relating to the Obligations under Article 16.2.1(a) of the CAFTA-DR of June 14, 2017.
In this case, the Panel found that the US had not demonstrated that Guatemala had breached the relevant labour provisions.
19 For an overview of relevant complaints visit the webpage of the US Department of Labor (Office on Trade and Labor Affairs) at https://www.dol.gov/
agencies/ilab/our-work/trade/fta-submissions. One complaint concerning Costa Rica had been withdrawn after the subject matter at hand had been
addressed at the domestic level (ILO, 2013, pp. 51, 55).
20 For examples regarding cases under the NAALC see Schurtman (2005, pp. 332–333); Compa and Brooks (2015, pp. 63–64). See also Oehri (2017) in
this issue.
21 These FTAs are not yet in force or not yet fully in force and the ICS is therefore not yet in operation.
22 See arts. 18.27 and 18.28. CETA; art. 13 EUVFTA.
23 Art. 8.23 (1) CETA, and art. 2 EUVFTA.
24 Art. 8.35 CETA; art. 20 EUVFTA.
25 Art. 4 UNCITRAL Transparency Rules.
26 Art. 8.38 CETA; art. 25 EUVFTA.
27 Art. 8.23 (2) CETA; art. 7 2 EUVFTA.
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ing to amicably settle the dispute.28 None of the agree-
ments requires exhaustion of domestic remedies.29 The
material jurisdiction of ICS is strictly limited to breaches
of rights granted to investors by the treaty.30 When a
breach is found, the only possible outcomes are mon-
etary damages or restitution of property,31 but to pre-
serve state sovereignty, in no case may the tribunal an-
nul a state measure or order a positive measure. Costs
are normally borne by the unsuccessful party, unless cir-
cumstances warrant otherwise.32
An ICS-like mechanism may carry some advantages
with respect to the enforcement of labour provisions.
First, the possibility of offering a binding outcome to
private parties and of holding defaulting governments
to account may increase the focus on compliance and
thereby reduce the politicization of the application of
labour provisions (see Gött, in press). Second, invest-
ment arbitration is typically more expeditious than judi-
cial remedies, even though the addition of an appeals
mechanism may lengthen the proceedings. Third, such a
mechanism would also avoid giving the impression that
the protection of labour standards is considered by the
EU to be less important than investor protection and
might contribute to increasing the legitimacy of the EU’s
trade policy as a whole.
A number of obstacles would, however, have to be
overcome if a mechanismmodelled on ICS as it currently
stands (hereinafter ‘ICS-like mechanism’), were to be ef-
fectively employed as a way to enforce labour provisions.
First, the material jurisdiction of investment tribunals is
strictly limited to a few well-defined treaty provisions
(see above). Subjecting the more wide-ranging commit-
ments contained in labour provisions to an ICS-likemech-
anism would significantly expand its scope, thereby in-
creasing the potential number of cases, and requiring the
tribunal’s breadth of expertise to bemore extensive than
what is now required of arbitrators.
Second, ICS standing is strictly limited to foreign in-
vestors, but labour provisions concern a wider group of
third parties, which would require making determina-
tions as to which interests deserve to be granted access.
Host states typically grant direct access to an arbitral
mechanism because they hope to attract capital and re-
lated benefits such as tax revenue, jobs, transfers of tech-
nology, knowhow, etc. (Choi, 2007, pp. 732–733). This
kind of governmental incentive to provide investors ac-
cess to an ICS-likemechanism is not as clear in the labour
context. Also, potentially affected stakeholders aremuch
more numerous, and ways to limit standing in a fair and
non-discriminatory manner would have to be carefully
elaborated, for instance by limiting it to representative
organisations such as trade unions, employers’ organiza-
tions, particularly interested civil society organizations,
or to a minimal number of claimants grouped together.
Additionally, if standingwere still to be granted to individ-
uals, it could be limited through the customary require-
ment of exhausting domestic remedies, which is gener-
ally waived in investment arbitration (see also Stoll, Gött,
& Abel, 2017, pp. 39, 41).
Relatedly, standing implies that the claimant may
rely on litigable rights, whereas currently TSD chapters
partly tend to restate general state commitments, in
particular towards ILO Conventions, which may require
some rewriting in order to be read, e.g., as standards of
treatment, or as commitments to attaining well-defined
goals, which would be effectively litigable by third par-
ties. Likewise, state measures lowering social standards
for the purpose of attracting trade or investment might
be opened to direct challenge.33 This, while arguably pur-
suing the desirable goal of putting labour concerns on
an equal footing with economic objectives, would rad-
ically alter the balance of the entire agreement, since
trade commitments would be matched with directly en-
forceable social provisions. States would therefore have
to consider whether they are willing, in the context of an
agreement on trade, to complement labour provisions
obligations with such a strong dispute settlementmecha-
nism, whereas they were not willing to do so when they
undertook the initial commitment in, e.g., the ILO Con-
ventions linked to the TSD chapters. One way to address
this issue could be to limit the scope of enforceable pro-
visions concerning labour rights to a relatively small num-
ber of litigable commitments.
Fifth, in terms of remedies sought, ICS can only
award monetary damages or order restitution of prop-
erty. These types of remedies indexed on a commer-
cial logic are less suitable to compensating the breach
of labour rights obligations, which often require putting
in place long-term strategies and implementing them
through a series of measures. Ensuring that these strate-
gies andmeasures are adopted and implemented is in all
likelihood what the claimant in such cases would want
to seek, not necessarily monetary damages. Adapting
this aspect in an ICS-like mechanism to include the pos-
sibility for the tribunal to order measures would, as in-
dicated above, represent another significant inroad into
state sovereignty, as it would limit the states’ freedom to
determine their own levels of domestic protection in the
social area,34 which they have so far been careful to pre-
serve. The threat of such monetary sanction might, how-
ever, be one incentive to foster compliance and change.
A final obstacle which can be identified in relation
to ICS, concerns the costs involved in litigating through
such a dispute settlement system. The costs are typically
28 Art 8.21 (1) CETA; art. 6 (1) EUVFTA.
29 Art. 8.22 (1) (f) and (g) CETA; art. 8.1 and 4 (b) EUVFTA.
30 Art. 8.18 CETA; art. 1 EUVFTA.
31 Art 8.39 (a) CETA; art. 27 EUVFTA.
32 Art 8.39 (5) CETA; art. 27.4 EUVFTA.
33 See Chapter 16, art. 10 EUVFTA.
34 See Chapter 16, art. 2 EUVFTA.
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high (OECD, 2012) and may not be affordable for private
parties unless measures are taken to limit them.35 This
could be done in a number of ways, for instance by cap-
ping arbitrator fees; by ensuring that the place of arbi-
tration does not involve excessive travel for the parties
(or by working at a distance or through electronic means
as much as possible); by setting up a legal aid fund or by
waiving the cost of proceedings for vulnerable claimants.
In sum, the main advantage of an ICS-like mecha-
nism would be to enhance the enforcement potential of
labour chapters by allowing non-state actors to sue state
parties for breaches of their treaty-based rights. How-
ever, our examination evidences significant obstacles re-
lated to scope, standing, remedies and costs. At the very
least—and without pre-judging the political feasibility of
such adaptations—in order for an ICS-like mechanism to
work in this context, the following aspects would need to
be carefully designed: (i) management of the potential
number of claims by limiting standing to groups of indi-
viduals or by requiring exhaustion of domestic remedies;
(ii) precise identification of the kinds of claims which
would be admissible before the ICS-like mechanisms, in
respect of the labour rights covered and the types of
violations alleged; (iii) redress mechanisms that would
be compatible with the nature of labour rights; (iv) a
cost-model that remains accessible to private individu-
als or not-for-profit organizations representing labour
rights interests.
3.3. Integrating a Third Party Versus Third Party
Dimension into the Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The
Example of Voluntary Sustainability Standards
Another existing initiative that might be considered for
the purpose of strengthening enforcement of FTA labour
provisions through dispute settlement concerns VSS,
also known as sustainability certification schemes and
eco-labels (United Nations Forum on Sustainability Stan-
dards, 2013). Examples of such VSS include the stan-
dards adopted by the Fair Labour Association, the Fair
Wear Foundation, and the Forest Stewardship Council
(FSC). They involve a collection of organisations that cer-
tify producers that adhere to a set of sustainability stan-
dards. These standards are developed on the basis of
broad principles and commitments which are often also
referred to in the context of FTAs and refer inter alia
to the protection of labour rights such as the protec-
tion of freedom of association and collective bargain-
ing. How do they do this? First, they base the sustain-
ability standards they develop on existing international
law by including references to international legal com-
mitments in the foundational principles of VSS. Many of
them refer explicitly to different ILO Conventions. Sec-
ond, and importantly for the purpose of assessing com-
pliance, they translate these principles in measurable in-
dicators and action. In a third step, they develop a com-
prehensive institutional framework to monitor compli-
ancewith these standards including the provision of com-
plaint mechanisms. These complaint mechanisms allow
‘internal’ participants (members of VSS organizations,
VSS certificate holders, etc.) and ‘external’ stakeholders
to raise issues relevant to the functioning of VSS includ-
ing non-compliance with standards. Dispute settlement
mechanisms provide a necessary complement to confor-
mity assessment and auditing in order to foster compli-
ance. Recently, one can observe the emergence of dis-
pute settlement mechanisms in many VSS such as the
Fair Wear Foundation and the Fair Labour Association.
They take a variety of forms but several VSS allow exter-
nal stakeholders (NGOs, citizens, etc.) to file a dispute if
they believe that a violation of standards occurs. In or-
der to enable stakeholders to raise a dispute, several VSS
have also installed transparency measures through in-
formation disclosure procedures. Information disclosure
procedures can inform different stakeholders on com-
pliance with standards. Publicly available information in
this context includes specific information about certifica-
tion procedures, auditing reports, reports on violations,
and reports on corrective action plans. This allows stake-
holders to assess whether the reported information mir-
rors real conditions (Marx, 2014).
As noted above, some VSS have a complaint mecha-
nism that allows for initiating a dispute in case of non-
compliance with sustainable development provisions.
This approach, which is a third-party to third-party sys-
tem, could inspire the development of a dispute settle-
mentmechanism for FTAs. Themodel of VSS targets com-
panies more directly. If non-compliance is proven, a sig-
nificant sanction is available in the form of annulation or
suspension of a certificatewhichwould influencemarket
access in the importing country (Marx, 2014). Companies
are key actors in the context of an FTA aswell as for ensur-
ing the implementation of labour standards, but they are
not currently parties to the agreement. However, most
violations with regard to the provisions contained in the
TSD chapters are the result of companies’ behaviour. In-
volving companies more directly in a FTA would imply a
shared responsibility of states and firms to comply with
the provisions in FTA labour chapters. Under this model,
a dispute can be initiated by a range of third parties,
sometimes including individual citizens. An equivalent in
the context of FTAs would be to have a ban for specific
products of specific companies in cases of repeated non-
compliance by companies exporting products to the EU.
4. Connecting the Dispute Settlement Mechanism of
EU FTAs More Effectively to Existing Instruments
4.1. Connecting the Dispute Settlement Mechanism to
the International Labour Rights System: The Case of the
ILO Supervisory Mechanisms
The inclusion of labour provisions in FTAs raises the ques-
tion of how their coherence with the ILO’s international
35 See e.g. art. 8.39 (6) CETA and art. 27 EUVFTA.
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labour rights system can be ensured. This question is all
the more relevant given that most EU FTA labour pro-
visions expressly refer to ILO instruments. Especially in
recent EU FTAs, references are, unlike in their US coun-
terparts, typically to the ILO’s Fundamental Conventions
rather than to only the ILO’s Declaration on Fundamental
Principles and Rights Work of 1998 (see ILO, 2013, p. 72,
2016, pp. 50–51). The interpretation and application of
the relevant provisions can therefore directly rely on a
body of guidelines elaborated by the relevant ILO quasi-
judicial bodies, which is not available for the ILO’s 1998
Declaration.36 This opens several avenues for connect-
ing the labour provisions of EU FTAs to the ILO’s labour
rights system.
The input by the ILO can, first and foremost, con-
cern factual information on the situation of a particular
country. In addition, legal guidance can be provided on
the meaning of a particular convention as well as find-
ings as to whether a given country is in compliance with
the conventions it has ratified. This could, among oth-
ers, be based on the reports of the ILO Committee of
Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recom-
mendations, which regularly reviews ILO member states’
compliance with the conventions ratified by them, or
the ILO’s various submission-based procedures (Agusti-
Panareda, Ebert, & Clercq, 2015, pp. 370, 372–373).37
Arguably, the most effective way to ensure consis-
tency between the application of FTA labour provisions
and the relevant ILO instruments would be to require the
parties to a dispute or the panel itself to request the ILO’s
input, especially with regard to the interpretation of the
provisions referencing ILO instruments.38 Such guidance
could be sought by the parties at the consultation level
as well as by the panel prior to delivering its report on
the merits. Seeking such guidance by the panel should
be mandatory rather than optional where labour provi-
sions referring to ILO instruments are at stake. In the
absence of a legally binding ruling of the International
Court of Justice or of a specific (so far non-existent) ILO
Tribunal on the matter at issue,39 the panel should con-
sider the guidance emanating from the ILO as an authori-
tative treatment of the subject and only divert therefrom
in exceptional circumstances and with justification.
One question arises as to which specific body of the
ILO could provide such guidance. Given the specific man-
date of existing supervisory bodies, their respectiveman-
dates may have to be extended if they were to provide
the relevant guidance directly. Alternatively, the Inter-
national Labour Office, the ILO’s Secretariat, could com-
pile relevant legal information, including, as the casemay
be, in consultationwith relevant bodies. The Office could
also offer technical assistance as well as carrying out ad-
visory services to support the implementation of labour
standards. Prospectively, the establishment of ad hoc
committees by the ILO’s Governing Body for the purpose
of providing relevant interpretations could also be con-
sidered (Agusti-Panareda et al., 2015, pp. 370–371, 377).
Putting in place a robust procedure regarding consulta-
tions with the ILO would not only be an important step
towards avoiding further fragmentation of the interna-
tional labour regime but could also increase the quality
and legitimacy of the panel’s reports.
4.2. Connecting the Dispute Settlement Mechanism to
Third Party Versus Third Party Mechanism: The Case of
the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises
(Guidelines) provide institutional mechanisms for hold-
ing actors accountable in case of non-compliance with
international standards, also referred to in FTA TSD chap-
ters. The Guidelines are a set of recommendations ad-
dressed by participating governments toMNEs operating
in or from their territory, on conduct relating, inter alia,
to labour rights, environmental protection and human
rights. As of November 2017, they were subscribed to by
48 states (all 35 OECD member states and 13 non-OECD
members). All adhering states must establish a National
Contact Point (NCP) at the domestic level to enhance the
effectiveness of the Guidelines by promotional activities,
the handling of enquiries and by ‘contributing to the res-
olution of issues that arise relating to the implementa-
tion of the Guidelines in specific instances’ (OECD, 2011,
p. 68, § 1).
Under this dispute resolution mechanism, any inter-
ested party may raise a ‘specific instance’ with an NCP
when the party has evidence that an MNE is in non-
compliance (domestically or abroad) with the Guidelines
(OECD, 2011, p. 72, section C). The NCP deals with spe-
cific instances in three phases.40 In the first phase, the
NCP conducts ‘an initial assessment of whether the is-
sues raised merit further examination’, or should be dis-
missed (OECD, 2011, p. 72, section C §1). Where a spe-
cific instance deserves ‘further examination’, the NCP is
required, in a second phase, to ‘discuss the issue further
with the parties involved and offer ‘good offices’ with a
view to facilitating the resolution of the problem’ (OECD,
2011, pp. 72–73, §2, 83–84, §28). In the concluding third
phase, the NCP makes the results of the mediation pub-
licly available. If consensus is reached, it will issue a re-
port stating that the parties have reached an agreement
(OECD, 2011, p. 73, §3b). If consensus is not attained or
if a party refuses to participate, the NCP has the author-
ity to ‘make recommendations on the implementation of
the Guidelines as appropriate’ (OECD, 2011, p. 73, §3c).
A statement declaring that a given MNE has breached
36 The 1998 Declaration is only subject to a promotional follow-up (La Hovary, 2009, pp. 254–256).
37 The latter include representations to an ad hoc tripartite committee, complaints to be examined by an ad hoc commission of inquiry as well as a
special procedure for freedom of association under which representations are examined by a standing tripartite committee (ILO, 2014, pp. 106–111).
38 In addition, the parties and the panel could of course consult the publicly available information made available on the ILO’s website.
39 Cf. art. 37 of the ILO Constitution.
40 In some cases, NCPs can also conduct research on their own motion without a specific complaint being filed.
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the Guidelines is, however, rarely issued in practice. The
statement of conclusion constitutes the only ‘sanction-
ing’ mechanism that NCPs have at their disposal, as they
lack authority to impose sanctions in the formof financial
penalties, the suspension of licenses or the like (Davarne-
jad, 2011, p. 364). This mechanism is accordingly consid-
ered by some to be relatively weak (Fick Vendzules, 2010,
p. 480), as it relies on MNEs to take voluntary corrective
action, which does not always materialise in significant
changes (Ruggie & Nelson, 2015, p. 122).
The Guidelines and the NCPs could be connected
to FTA labour provisions in various ways. First, the sub-
stance of the Guidelines could be linked to the FTA at is-
sue. The most straightforward way to do this would con-
sist of incorporating the content of the Guidelines into
the FTA. This is possible since the adoption of the Guide-
lines is not restricted to OECD members, but is open to
all states. Such incorporation of the Guidelines, in turn,
would imply both a deepening and widening of the sub-
stantive provisions in the FTAs since the Guidelines cover
substantive issues that are currently not covered in most
FTA labour provisions, such as the obligation to provide
certain information to employee representatives.
Second, andmore importantly from a procedural per-
spective, wording could be included in the TSD chap-
ter which requires the dispute settlement bodies estab-
lished under the FTA (state-to-state or otherwise) to take
into account the findings of the NCPs. This could pro-
vide additional leverage to the NCPs’ determinations
in case of established non-compliance with the Guide-
lines. At the same time, this would also help to en-
sure that the FTA labour provisions are applied in co-
herence with these Guidelines. Where the parties are
not already adhering to the Guidelines, a provision could
be inserted into the FTA to require the parties to adopt
the Guidelines.
5. Discussion
This article started from the observation that most re-
cent EU FTAs contain labour standards-related commit-
ments whose enforcementmechanisms are, however, in-
sufficient to have a significant impact in practice. This
concerns especially the extant dispute settlement mech-
anisms. One way to think about how to address this con-
cern is to look at existing mechanisms. While the instru-
ments discussed in this article are not a panacea for
labour standards protection, they may provide inspira-
tion for rethinking existing approaches. In this regard, the
article looked at five arrangements to identify key com-
ponents for improving the current dispute settlement
mechanism of EU FTA labour provisions.
The case of US FTAs provided insights into the value
of complaint and sanctionmechanisms.We argued, how-
ever, that to be effective suchmechanisms need to come
with direct access of stakeholders to dispute settlement,
andwe drew on the ICS to reflect on possible avenues for
achieving this. Such a mechanism could also be comple-
mented with a third party-third party dispute settlement
component, as it exists under certain labour-related VSS.
In a further step, we then examined options to better
link dispute settlement mechanisms in EU FTA labour
provisions to other related international arrangements
of relevance to labour standards, namely the ILO super-
visory mechanisms and the NCPs related to the OECD
MNE Guidelines.
Integrating features of these different approaches,
possibly in an entirely new model, arguably holds signif-
icant potential for enhancing the enforcement mecha-
nisms of FTA labour provisions and, thereby, for ensuring
that the relevant labour standards commitments do not
remain empty promises in the books. It goes without say-
ing that the mechanisms discussed above could not be
harnessed for EU FTA labour provisions without the nec-
essary adjustments. For example, themonetary compen-
sation designed to compensate for individual economic
damages under the investment court systemmay not be
appropriate for labour standards violations where dam-
ages are much harder to quantify.
In the process of adapting these components, a few
choices would need to be made, including the follow-
ing. A first choice would be to decide who the target
of a complaint should be: the state, an individual com-
pany or both. The case of the VSS discussed above offer
ways to think about how companies might be targeted
more directly. A second choice pertains to who has ac-
cess to the complaint mechanisms. Does this remain a
state-to-state affair, which is only accessible to the EU
and other parties to the agreement, or will it provide ac-
cess to a range of stakeholders who can pursue alleged
breaches of the obligations contained in TSD chapters.
A third choice concerns the use of sanctions as a mea-
sure of last resort, which could involve trade sanctions or
other economic sanctions, such as fines. There is a need
to reflect upon how these sanctions can be designed in
a way that avoids disproportionate or otherwise unde-
sirable effects, including relating to harm of vulnerable
parts of the population or trade diversion.
Clearly, the implementation of a new model based
on the components set out above would require signif-
icant political will by the trading partners concerned. It
is worth highlighting, though, that all the elements dis-
cussed have already been tested in other fora. Given
the current legitimacy crisis of economic globalization,
the timing may be apposite for experimenting with in-
novative arrangements to ensure that FTAs are also so-
cially beneficial.
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